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ABSTRACT 
This paper responds to Kim and Mahoney’s “How Property Rights Economics 
Furthers the Resource-Based View: Resources, Transaction Costs and 
Entrepreneurial Discovery” (a comment on Foss and Foss, 2005). While we agree 
with many of their arguments, we argue that they fail to recognize how exactly 
transaction costs and property rights shape the process of entrepreneurial 
discovery. We provide a sketch of the mechanisms that link entrepreneurship, 
property rights, and transaction costs in a resource-based setting, contributing 
further to the attempt to take the RBV in a more dynamic direction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are grateful to Kim and Mahoney (2006) for their friendly critique of our 2005 paper, 
“Resources and Transaction Costs: How Property Rights Economics Furthers the Resource-
based View.” We agree with most of their arguments and in particular with their attempt to 
link ideas on entrepreneurship to ideas on property rights and transaction costs. However, 
their linking of these ideas does not go sufficiently far.  
It has been argued that “… in transaction cost economics, the functioning market is as much a 
black box as is the firm in neoclassical microeconomic theory” (Holmström and Roberts 
1998: 77). In particular, entrepreneurship ⎯ a crucial part of “the functioning market”⎯ is 
missing from current thinking on property rights and transaction costs, and Kim and Mahoney 
go some way in linking these. However, we argue that Kim and Mahoney do not go 
sufficiently far in linking ideas on transaction costs, property rights, and entrepreneurship. 
Kim and Mahoney rightly point to “… how property theory … in conjunction with resource-
based theory [can] allow us to understand economic rent generation as a dynamic process” 
(p.2). However, we believe that it is possible to be more precise with respect to how exactly 
property rights and transaction costs shape the process of entrepreneurial discovery. In this 
paper, we provide a sketch of the mechanisms that link entrepreneurship, strategic rents, and 
transaction costs in a resource-based setting, thus contributing further to the attempt to take 
the RBV in a more dynamic direction.  
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Entrepreneurship as Judgment 
Like Kim and Mahoney (2006), we consider Austrian economics to be a natural complement 
to notions of property rights and transaction costs (see also Littlechild, 1986; Foss and Foss, 
2000; Kim and Mahoney, 2002; Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein, 2006). Modern Austrian 
economists (such as Kirzner 1973; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985; Littlechild 1986) view 
economic activities as ongoing processes of discovery. In this conception, agents’ plans are 
based on incomplete, imperfect and subjectively held knowledge about the plans of other 
agents. This results in behavior that is off the equilibrium path and in the emergence of 
disequilibrium prices. Also, equilibria may be upset by Schumpeterian entrepreneurs 
(Schumpeter, 1934). However, alert arbitraging entrepreneurs “… grasp the opportunities for 
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pure entrepreneurial profit created by temporary absence of full adjustment” (Kirzner 1997: 
69), and restore a tendency towards equilibrium.  
Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein (2006) develop the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment 
drawing on Knight (1921), Mises (1949) and Casson (1982).  This view traces its origins to 
the first systematic treatment of entrepreneurship in economics, Cantillon’s Essai sur la 
nature de commerce en géneral (1755). It conceives entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making 
when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is 
generally unknown (what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk). More 
generally, judgment is required “when no obviously correct model or decision rule is available or 
when relevant data is unreliable or incomplete” (Casson, 1982: 17). Judgment must be exercised 
even in mundane circumstances, as Knight (1921) emphasized, for ongoing operations as well 
as new ventures.1  
Knight (1921) introduced judgment in order to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Judgment 
primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates of future events in situations in 
which the relevant probability distributions are themselves unknown. Entrepreneurship 
represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, 
accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, 1921: 311). In other words, there is no market for the 
judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the person 
with judgment to start a firm. Of course, judgmental decision makers can hire consultants, 
forecasters, technical experts, and so on. However, in doing so they are exercising their own 
entrepreneurial judgment. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-
making is ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources (or, as we shall later 
argue, of resource attributes).  
The notion of entrepreneurship as judgment implies an obvious link with the theory of the 
firm, particularly those theories (transaction cost economics and the property-rights approach) 
                                                 
1 Somewhat in contrast, in Kirzner’s treatment, entrepreneurship is characterized as “… a responding agency. I 
view the entrepreneur not as a source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that 
exist already and are waiting to be noticed” (Kirzner, 1973: 74). 
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that put asset ownership at the forefront of firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995) 
(cf. also Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).2 However, there is also close link to Penrose’s (1959) 
theory of the firm, and particularly to her notion of the management team that based on 
heterogenous and path-dependent experience formulates an image of the firm’s “productive 
opportunity set” (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).   
Entrepreneurship and Transaction Costs 
Foss and Foss (2005) asked what would happen to resource value and resource-based 
strategies in a world of zero transaction costs, and then discussed the implications of 
introducing transaction costs. Consider the same kind of thought experiment, this performed 
with respect to entrepreneurship.  
What does it mean to say that transaction costs are zero? In one interpretation, “… zero 
transaction costs includes the assumption that information about others’ characteristics is 
common knowledge” (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001: 531). In Coase’s (1988) own 
interpretation (as well as in Barzel, 1997), zero transaction costs include this, as well as 
considerable (perhaps perfect) foresight. Thus, zero transaction costs literally means that 
present and future resource uses are known to decision-makers. In such a world, there is no 
scope for entrepreneurship.  
However, such a world implies unrealistic cognitive powers on the part of decision-makers.  
And  
... given the constraints affecting the availability of information and human 
cognitive capacity, each decision-maker has only partial understanding of the 
options extant in society, and it is no longer possible to assume that each person 
knows everything about current technological alternatives, the nature and 
availability of all productive resources, the existence and true properties of every 
commodity in the system” (Furubotn, 2002: 75).  
A world of positive transaction cost is therefore one in which judgment has to be exercised 
with respect to future resource uses. This cognitive capacity is not necessary in a world of 
                                                 
2 The firm is defined as the entrepreneur plus the alienable assets he owns and therefore ultimately controls. As 
Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein (2006) The theory of the firm then becomes a theory of how the entrepreneur 
arranges his heterogeneous capital assets—what combinations of assets will he seek to acquire, what (proximate) 
decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide incentives and use monitoring to see that his 
assets are used consistently with his judgments, and so on. 
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zero transaction costs, as all resource uses will effectively be mediated by the price system. 
In this sense, the existence of transaction costs makes possible the exercise of 
entrepreneurship conceived of as judgment. However, there are further links between 
transaction costs and entrepreneurship on this fundamental level.   
Assume that the economy is initially in a state of equilibrium, but with positive transaction 
costs. All entrepreneurial activities have ceased.  Some shock then disturbs the economy, for 
example, some essential input that is used in the production of several products becomes 
scarce (as in Hayek, 1945). In a zero transaction cost world, “… when equilibrium is 
disturbed a new equilibrium is instantaneously attained because, given zero transaction costs, 
the cost of adjustment is zero” (Barzel, 1997: 11). In particular, there is no need for 
entrepreneurs to equilibrate markets.  However, the economy under examination is one where 
transaction costs are zero.  And “[w]hen equilibrium is disturbed in a positive transaction cost 
world, price adjustment is not expected to be instantaneous” (Barzel, 1997: 12).  “Menu 
costs,” contractual costs of all sorts, costs of searching for alternative exchange partners, etc. 
imply that price adjustment is sluggish. In this world, (Kirznerian) entrepreneurs step in to 
equilibrate markets based on their alert perception of profit opportunities. In sum, transaction 
costs and entrepreneurship can be neatly linked.  The next step is linking entrepreneurship to 
property rights.  
DISCOVERING RESOURCE ATTRIBUTES 
In order to see how entrepreneurship connects to issues of property rights, it is convenient to 
take the work of Barzel (1997) as a starting point.  He consistently defines notions of property 
rights in terms of expectations in a way that is consistent with the Austrian emphasis on 
subjectivism (e.g., O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985). Thus, Barzel (1994: 394) defines a property 
right as “... an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume 
the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly through exchange.” Property rights can be 
hold to attributes of an asset Attributes are characteristics and possible uses of assets.   
In Foss and Foss (2005) we make use of the idea in property rights theory that resources are 
bundles of attributes.3 Although Barzel stresses property rights to known attributes of 
                                                 
3 Kim and Mahoney (2006: 10) instead define resources as bundles of property rights. While resource value is 
determined by the property rights that are held to the attributes of a resource, we think that resources should be 
defined in terms of attributes. 
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resources as the relevant units of analysis, we think it is important to stress that most assets 
have multiple non-specified and not yet discovered attributes.  For example, a parcel of land 
can be used for building houses or a factory, for recreational purposes and so on. The owner 
of the parcel buys the rights to exploit a bundle of attributes. Some of the attributes will be 
known to buyer and seller at the time of trade while some will be unknown. Thus, the buyer 
may acquire the parcel to build a factory and as the builders prepare the foundation of the 
building, they may discover an oil well (an unknown attribute). The owner earns a pure 
windfall profit from this discovery. The value to the resource owner of the attribute depends 
on whether he holds secure property rights to the relevant attribute.   
Thus, property rights matter even in the case of pure luck.  However, the discovery of many 
resource attributes is not a matter of pure luck; it is part of an entrepreneurial discovery 
process (as argued above) and this process is strongly influenced by property rights because 
they influence which of the attributes that are known to entrepreneurs they will explore and 
therefore their judgment and their entrepreneurial actions. However, the discovery of resource 
attributes often is path dependent and when entrepreneurs decide not to explore certain 
attributes, they implicitly cut themselves off from the discovery of a number of other 
attributes.4 In other words, property rights steer the entrepreneurial discovery process.  For 
example, if the entrepreneur cannot hold (sufficiently) secure property rights to certain 
resource attributes, he will not explore these and certain resource attributes may therefore 
never be discovered and explored.  
The general idea is that property rights and the transaction costs involved in defining and 
securing property rights strongly influence an entrepreneur’s expectations regarding the value 
of the attribute that he can appropriate. If the entrepreneur is able to discover ways of 
reducing the relevant transaction costs, such discovery influence his expectations regarding 
the value he can appropriate from resources. For this reason we expect entrepreneurs to be 
engaged in searching for ways of reducing transaction costs. This is the kind of 
entrepreneurship that was implicitly addressed in Foss and Foss (2005). For example, new 
ways of defining (e.g., better ways of measuring attributes), protecting (e.g., ways of 
protecting credit card information in virtual exchanges), and exchanging (e.g., internet trade) 
property rights result from entrepreneurial action. 
                                                 
4 They may still know that these attributes exist although they do not explore their precise characteristics.  
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However, we recognize that entrepreneurship involves more than reducing transaction cost 
impediments to the definition, protection and exchange of property rights.  Entrepreneurship 
also involves discovering new resource attributes themselves, as stated above. However, our 
main point here is that these two aspects of entrepreneurship are highly interdependent! Thus, 
reduction of the costs of defining, protecting and exchanging property rights brought about by 
entrepreneurial action can be expected to impact the entrepreneurs’ judgment with respect to 
the value of hitherto unexplored attributes.  
As an example, consider the firm. The firm arguably lowers the costs of combining and 
recombining knowledge resources relative to market exchange (as recognized by Kim and 
Mahoney, 2006). One reason is that property rights to such resources are better protected 
inside firms than in markets. Arguably, firms may also have advantages in measuring 
knowledge resources (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). “Combinative capabilities” (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992) have a significant transaction cost dimension. These transaction costs 
advantages allow for more entrepreneurial exploration of the attributes of knowledge assets 
than markets do. Thus, the modern firm allowed for an exploration of attributes that would 
not have taken place in its absence. In fact, much the same can be argued for the institutions 
that support market exchange (cf. Casson, 1982; Loasby 1994). Contracts, reputation 
mechanisms, contract law, product warranties, standards, etc. reduce the costs of combining 
and recombining (typically, non-knowledge) resources. Such entrepreneurial institution-
making may be seen as representing discontinuities in terms of reducing the costs of exploring 
numerous resource combinations (of course, there are also more incremental processes taking 
place in the interstices of established institutions; Langlois, 1992).  
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW 
Kim and Mahoney (2006: 14) extend Foss and Foss (2005) to include “… not only 
economizing on transaction costs, but also the dynamic search for increasing entrepreneurial 
rent.” Our contributions in this comment on Kim and Mahoney is to point out that 
economizing on transaction cost and entrepreneurship are intertwined, and to suggest some 
ways in which transaction costs shape the process of entrepreneurial discovery. Several 
implications for the resource-based view follow from our discussion.  
Implications for strategic factor markets.  In an important contribution to the RBV, Barney 
(1986) argued that luck or asymmetrical information on the demand side of input markets 
 6
(“strategic factor markets”) are necessary for competitive advantage. If the supply and 
demand side of the market hold identical information sets, they will arrive at identical 
estimates of the contribution of a resource to value creation. With reasonably competitive 
input markets, the price of a resource will equal its discounted net present value. However, 
this argument abstracts from entrepreneurial judgment and how it is linked to transaction 
costs.  Judgment goes beyond the asymmetrical information paradigm assumed in Barney 
(1986). Thus, other agents are fundamentally ignorant about the contents of the entrepreneur’s 
vision (Knight, 1921; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993); they don’t know that there are things they 
don’t know (whereas in the asymmetrical information paradigm, agents know what they lack 
information about, cf. Littlechild, 1986; Kirzner, 1997). Moreover, we have argued that 
transaction costs influence the exercise of judgment; for example, entrepreneurs may refrain 
from forming judgments over the use of resource attributes that are costly to protect.  This 
means that the expectations entrepreneurs form over the values of resource attributes are 
influenced by transaction cost. Equilibria on strategic factor markets are therefore constrained 
by transaction costs. A further implication is that if the costs of protecting a certain resource 
attribute are lowered, this attribute may become more attractive for the entrepreneur. It may 
become part of entrepreneurial judgment. For example, the invention of barbed wire 
introduced a number of new uses of land, including new ways of raising cattle. Entrepreneurs 
that understand the implications of changing transaction costs for resource uses may be in a 
position to beat the supply side on strategic factor markets in the sense of acquiring resources 
at a price below the discounted net present value.   
Resource value. The role of the entrepreneur is to discover valuable attributes. He will tend to 
look for attributes that give rise to rents. We argue that firms’ ability to earn rents is 
intimately linked with to the creation and enforcement of property rights over attributes (Foss 
and Foss, 2005). In turn creation and enforcement of property rights depend on the transaction 
costs involved in these activities. For these reasons the value of resources is partly an outcome 
of the process of discovering attributes of the resource and partly of economizing with 
transaction costs incurred in exploiting these attributes. Foss and Foss (2005) concentrated on 
how economizing with transaction costs influences resource value. Kim and Mahoney (2006) 
argued that the understanding of the discovery of new resource uses should be integrated with 
the RBV. However, as we have argued, reducing transaction costs and discovering new 
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resource attributes are closely related phenomena, and both are important for understanding 
resource value.  
Sustainability and the dynamics of rents.  The sustainability of competitive advantage and/or 
rents is usually treated as an equilibrium phenomenon (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 
1991). This is partly because differential rents are ill-defined outside equilibrium (Lippman 
and Rumelt, 2003), and partly because the interpretation of sustainability as a situation in 
which all attempts at imitating (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) or substituting (Barney, 1991) a 
successful firm’s resource portfolio have ceased is in itself an equilibrium conception. 
Technological changes are commonly seen as the factor that changes the distribution of 
competitive advantages in an industry. However, changes in transaction costs may play this 
role.  First, a reduction of transaction costs is also a reduction of the costs of combining and 
recombining resources, which in turn makes it more attractive for entrepreneurs to try to 
substitute the resource bundles of successful firms. Second, the reduction of the costs of 
combining and recombining resources imply that the cost of innovation are lowered. Third, 
changes in transaction costs imply changes in the costs of imitation (see Foss and Foss, 2005).   
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